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PoPulation action international 
uses research and advocacy to improve access to family planning 
and reproductive health care across the world so women and 
families can prosper and live in balance with the earth. By ensuring 
couples are able to determine the size of their families, poverty 
and the depletion of natural resources are reduced, improving the 
lives of millions across the world. 
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Matter to Climate Change?
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INTRODUCTION
Although integrated assessment models (IAM) of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) consider population, along with economic growth and 
technological change, as one of the root causes of greenhouse gas emissions, 
how population dynamics affect climate change is still under debate. While 
policy debates around climate change engender lively discussion on a number of 
factors, population is rarely mentioned. Studies in the past decade have added 
significantly to understanding the mechanisms and complexity of population and 
climate interactions. In addition to the growth of total population size, research 
shows that changes in population composition (i.e. age, urban-rural residence, 
and household structure) generate substantial effects on the climate system. 
Moreover, studies by the impact, vulnerability and adaptation (IAV) community 
also reveal that population dynamics are critical in the near term for building 
climate change resilience and within adaptation strategies. This paper explores 
how global population dynamics affect carbon emissions and climate systems, 
how recent demographic trends matter to worldwide efforts to adapt to climate 
change, and how population policies could make differences for climate change 
mitigation and adaptation.  
In the past two decades, increasing 
scientific evidence from the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPPC), the world’s leading body 
on climate change that includes over 2500 
scientists from 150 countries, indicates 
that global warming is occurring, mostly 
due to greenhouse gas emissions that 
are related to human activity. That global 
warming is unequivocal is nearly certain 
(98% confidence level) (Houghton, Callander 
and Varney 1992). Furthermore, most of the 
warming is very likely due to greenhouse 
gas emissions—with a confidence level of 
greater than 90% (Parry et al. 2007). The 
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report provides 
for the first time concrete observations of 
the effects of climate change on human 
society. The report, produced in 2007, 
indicates that global warming and its 
subsequent adverse impacts present a 
grave challenge for humanity. 
Making a clear and direct linkage  
between population change and climate 
change is complex because the effects of 
human activity on emissions are the product 
of a range of driving forces, including 
economic growth, technological changes, 
and population growth. Likewise, human
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vulnerability to climate change impacts is a 
complex concept, and the scope and scale 
of those impacts will be influenced by a 
wide range of factors, including not only 
demographic changes, but also geography, 
infrastructure, access to various forms 
of capital, and social and cultural factors. 
While the relationships between population 
and  the climate system are complicated, 
recent research has greatly improved 
our understanding of population-climate 
interactions. Increasing evidence suggests 
that the recent climate models have an 
important limitation in the demographic 
component which may have resulted in 
underestimating the impacts of population 
on climate change. Furthermore, population 
factors have yet to be fully incorporated into 
adaptation strategies. 
 Based on existing scientific evidence, 
 this paper explores (1) how popula-
tion changes affect the growth of global 
greenhouse gas emissions and result-
ing climate change; (2) how anticipated 
population trends affect future adaptive 
strategies for coping with the impacts 
of climate variation and change; and (3) 
how population policy responses could 
make a difference for climate change 
mitigation and adaptation.
POPULATION TRENDS AS A 
MAJOR DRIVING FORCE OF 
EMISSIONS GROWTH
Historical relationship between 
population growth and greenhouse 
gas emissions growth
Historical statistics reveal that population 
growth parallels increases in economic 
growth, energy consumption and 
greenhouse gas emissions. During the 200 
years between 1800 and 2000, energy 
use increased 35 fold, carbon emissions 
increased 20 fold, and the world’s population 
grew by a factor of 6 (Table 1). Meanwhile, 
global income (Gross Domestic Product) 
increased 70 times (Naki´cenovi´c et al. 
2007). While it is clear that technological 
changes have substantially improved energy 
efficiency and reduced carbon intensity 
during the past 200 years, there continues to 
be debate about whether population growth 
or increasing consumption levels have 
contributed relatively more to greenhouse 
gas emissions (Dietz, 2007; Ehrlich, 1971; 
Meyerson, 1998; Parikh, 1994). 
Table 1.  Changes in global population, economy, energy, 
and CO2 emissions
1800 2000 FACTOR 
Population  
(billion)
1 6 x6 
GDP (PPP trillion 
1990 US$)
0.5 36 x70 
Primary Energy 
(EJ)
12 440 x35 
CO2 Emissions 
(GtC)
0.3 6.4 x20 
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Making a clear and  
direct linkage  
between population change 
and climate change is 
complex because the 
effects of human activity on 
emissions are the product 
of a range of driving forces, 




Based on the assumption that economic 
development, technological change and 
population growth jointly determine energy 
consumption and carbon emissions, a 
number of statistical analyses have been 
conducted to explore the net effect of 
population growth. Using multinational time 
series data from several decades, these 
studies reveal that, after controlling for other 
variables (mainly economic growth and 
technology related to energy efficiency and 
carbon intensity), a one percent increase in 
population is generally associated with a one 
percent increase in carbon emissions (O’Neill 
2009) (Table 2). 
The findings from statistical analysis of 
historical data have been used to inform 
the projections of future climate change, 
including those of many models incorporated 
into IPCC reports.
POPUlaTION IN IPCC  
ClImaTe mODels
The 2000 IPCC Special Report on Emission 
Scenarios (SRES) identifies population 
growth, economic growth, technological 
change, and changes in patterns of energy 
and land use as the major driving forces of 
the growth in greenhouse gas emissions. 
Figure 1 depicts these root causes and 
the four families of scenarios from the 
SRES that represent future changes in 
those factors. The two ‘A’ scenarios of 
the top limbs of the “climate scenario” 
tree assume high economic growth, while 
the two ‘B’ scenarios of the bottom limbs 
imply a more environmentally-friendly 
development pattern. The two ‘1’ scenarios 
on the left limbs assume a more globalized 
or converged world, while the two ‘2’ 
scenarios on the right limbs assume less 
global cooperation, less technology transfer, 
and little support provided by rich countries 
to the global poor. The major characteristics 
of the four families of scenarios are 
summarized in Table 3. As far as population 
is concerned, the A1 and B1 scenarios 
assume low population growth, B2 assumes 
medium population growth, and A2 assumes 
high population growth (see Hoepf Young, 
Mogelgaard and Hardee 2009 for a more 
detailed explanation of population projections 
and climate models). 
Based on these scenarios, the projections 
produced by various climate models 
suggest a mixed relationship between 
population growth and carbon emissions 
in future decades (Figure 2). On the one 
hand, there is a generally positive relationship 
for most of the cases—carbon emissions 
will be low under the slow population 
growth scenario (B1) and high under the fast 
population growth scenario (A2), and will fall 
somewhere in the middle under the medium 
There continues to be debate 
about whether population 
growth or increasing 
consumption levels have 
contributed relatively more to 
greenhouse gas emissions.
Table 2. Net impact of population growth on carbon emissions
Study 
% increase in carbon emissions per  
1% increase in population
Dietz and Rosa 1997 1.15
Shi 2003 1.43
York, Rosa and Dietz 2003 0.98
Rosa, York and Dietz 2004 1.02
Cole and Neumayer 2004 0.98
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population growth scenario (B2). On the 
other hand, however, in two scenarios 
with the same population (A1 and B1), 
A1 produces much higher emissions than 
B1, due to the fact that A1 assumes the 
highest level of economic growth and rapid 
technological changes in energy efficiency,1 
while the economic growth pattern in B1 is 
not as rapid and is more environmentally-
friendly.2 Moreover, although A1 has lower 
population growth than A2, the emissions 
level in A1 is similar to or even higher than 
A2 before the year 2070. 
 Therefore, according to the output of  
 these models, higher population 
growth means more greenhouse gas 
emissions; with the same population 
growth, different economic and 
technological patterns produce very 
different emission outcomes; and under 
certain circumstances, the effects of 
economic growth and technological changes 
tend to be more substantial than population 
growth on future carbon emissions for at 
least several decades (O’Neill 2009). 
ImPROvINg UNDeRsTaNDINg 
Of DemOgRaPhIC ImPaCTs 
ON emIssIONs
In almost all climate models, population size 
is the only demographic variable considered. 
The assumption behind this treatment of 
the demographic component is that each 
individual in a population shares the same 
productive and consumptive behavior, an 
assumption that is inaccurate and mislead-
ing. Consumptive and productive patterns 
among various population groups differ, 
and as the proportion of various groups in a 
population change, the amounts of green-
house gases that the population emits also 
changes. 
Figure 1.  Schematic illustration of 
the IPCC Special Report on 
EmissionS Scenarios 
Table 3.  Main assumptions of the four families 
of SRES scenarios
A1 A2 B1 B2
Population  
Growth Low High Low Medium
GDP Growth Very High Medium High Medium
Technological Change Rapid Slow Medium Medium
Energy Use Very High High Low Medium







Source: Nakic´enovic´ et al. 2000.
In almost all climate models, 
population size is the only 
demographic variable 
considered. The assumption 
behind this treatment of the 
demographic component is that 
each individual in a population 
shares the same productive 
and consumptive behavior, an 
assumption that is inaccurate 
and misleading. 
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In order to more accurately account for 
demographic impact on future climate 
change, a growing number of studies 
have been conducted to address two 
important and related issues: (1) whether 
significantly different consumption and 
emission behaviors exist among population 
groups with various characteristics (Cole 
and Neumayer 2004; Cramer 1998; Dietz 
2007; Jiang 1999; Jones 1989; Liu et al. 
2003; Parikh and Shukla 1995; Prskawetz 
et al. 2004; Van Diepen 1994); and (2) 
whether the proportion of population groups 
with significantly different consumption 
and emission behaviors will change 
significantly in the future (Jiang and O’Neill 
2007; Lutz 2001; Mackellar et al. 1995; 
Prskawetz et al. 2004; Zeng et al. 2008). To 
address the first issue, analyses have been 
conducted based on historical statistics 
to identify the significant consumption 
and emission behavior that exists among 
people in developed vs. developing 
countries, populations living in small vs. 
large households, residents of rural vs. 



























































































Key: The Population over the A1 scenario does not appear in the figure because it is exactly the 
same as that for Population B1. 
Data Sources: Figure is based on the output of the climate model MESSAGE by the International 
Institute for Applied System Analysis (IIASA).
Figure 2 . Population changes and carbon emissions under IPCC 
SRES scenarios
Addressing both issues 
is important, and neither 
can be ignored to truly 
understand the extent of 
demographic impacts on 
future greenhouse gas 
emissions and climate 
change. 
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populations. To address the second issue, 
population and household projections 
have been carried out to explore the major 
demographic trends that may coincide with 
the changes in the shares of population 
groups representing significantly different 
consumption patterns. 
Addressing both issues is important, and 
neither can be ignored to truly understand 
the extent of demographic impacts on 
future greenhouse gas emissions and 
climate change. For instance, it would not 
be necessary to consider the impact of 
urbanization if there are not big differences 
in productive and consumptive behaviors 
between rural and urban populations. 
It would be sufficient to use only the 
national average per capita emissions. 
Furthermore, even if significant differences 
in consumptive and productive behavior are 
found between rural and urban populations, 
it would still not be necessary to consider 
the urban-rural dichotomy in the analysis if 
future change in the proportion of rural and 
urban population is not significant.
For illustrative purposes, we use the case of 
a hypothetical community with a population 
of 100,000, with 50% living in urban areas. 
Per capita greenhouse gas emissions for 
the urban and rural populations are 20 and 
10 units respectively, and this difference 
will remain constant for the future (Table 
4). Accordingly, the average per capita 
emission of the community is 15 units, 
which gives a total emission of 1,500,000 
units for the baseline year. Fifty years later, 
if the population size doubles (reaches 
200,000) and there are not any changes 
in the proportion of the population that is 
urbanized, the average per capita emissions 
will remain 15 units. The total emission 
will go up to 3,000,000 units because of 
the increase in total population size. Under 
this circumstance, one would not need to 
account for urban-rural difference in the 
demographic component of climate models.  
 However, if substantial urbanization  
 occurs and the community becomes 
compeletely urbanized 50 years later, 
the average per capita emissions will 
increase to 20 units. Therefore, the total 
emissions will be 4,000,000 units after 
considering the rural-urban difference, 
which will be significantly higher than the 
3,000,000 units seen when the rural-urban 
difference is not considered.
Studies conducted over more than two 
decades, based on historical statistics 
and household survey data, have revealed 
a number of important demographic 
characteristics that are associated with 
different patterns of energy consumption, 
including age structure, household size, 
and rural-urban division (Clark and Deurloo 
2006; Jiang and O’Neill 2004; Jones 1989; 
Table 4.  examples of carbon emissions under different urbanization scenari-
os 
Urbanization
Population (X1000) Per Capita Emissions Total  
EmissionsUrban Rural Total Urban Rural Average
Baseline 50% 50 50 100 20 10 15 1,500,000
50 Years Later
50% 100 100 200 20 10 15 3,000,000
100% 200 0 200 20 10 20 4,000,000
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O’Neill and Chen 2002; Pachauri 2004; 
Pachauri and Jiang 2008; Parikh and Shukla 
1995; Prskawetz, Jiang and O’Neill 2004; 
van Diepen 2000; Yamasaki and Tominaga 
1997). Projections of future population/
household changes also suggest that total 
population size, aging, urbanization and 
declining average household size will be 
important demographic trends in the  
coming decades. 
The United Nations’ recent population pro-
jections indicate that, while global population 
will grow, all population growth will occur 
in the developing world (Table 5). 
 The world will also become more  
 urban, with the proportion of urban 
population increasing from 48% in 2005 
to about 70% in 2050. In the coming 
decades, almost all world population 
growth will occur in the urban areas of 
developing countries. Population aging 
will happen in both developed and 
developing nations, with the proportion of 
the elderly (aged 60+) worldwide increasing 
from 10% in 2005 to 22% in 2050 (UNPD 
2007). Furthermore, household projections 
for major developed and developing 
countries also show that an increasing 
proportion of these populations will be 
living in smaller households (Dalton et  
al. 2008; Jiang and O’Neill 2007; Zeng et  
al. 2008). 
Using integrated assessment modeling 
approaches, research has focused on 
exploring the importance of population 
compositional changes on carbon emissions. 
In these integrated assessment models, 
the interactions of economic growth, 
technological changes and population 
dynamics are systematically taken into 
account. This type of modeling shows that 
beyond changes in total population size, 
Table 5.  Important global demographic trends 2005-2500 
2005 2050 
Population Size  
(Billion) 6.7 9.2 
Developed 1.2 1.2 
Developing 5.5 8.0 
Urban  
(Billion) (%) 3.3 (48%) 6.4 (70%) 
Developed 1.0 1.1 
Developing 2.3 5.3 
Elderly  
(60+ Billion) (%) 0.67 (10%) 2.0 (22%) 
Developed 0.24 0.4 
Developing 0.43 1.6 
Data Sources: UNPD.  UN Population Prospects 2006 Revision; UN Urbanization Prospects 2007 Revision
Projections of future 
population/household 
changes also suggest that 
total population size, aging, 
urbanization and declining 
average household size will 
be important demographic 
trends in the coming 
decades. 
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factors of population aging, urbanization, and 
household shrinking are major demographic 
trends that should be explicitly accounted 
for in projections of future climate change 
(Dalton et al. 2007; Dalton et al. 2008). 
Changes in total population size and 
household shrinking can have significant 
impacts on emissions in both developed 
and developing countries; considering the 
effects of population compositional changes, 
aging is a more important demographic 
factor related to carbon emissions in the 
developed world while urbanization is more 
significant in developing countries. 
The ImPaCT Of hOUsehOlD 
shRINkINg
An increasing number of studies have 
shown that households, instead of 
individuals in a population, should be used 
as the variable for analyzing demographic 
impact on emissions, as households are 
the units of consumption, and possibly also 
the units of production in developing 
societies (Jiang 1999; Liu et al. 2003; 
Mackellar et al. 1995; O’Neill and Chen 
2002; Prskawetz, Jiang and O’Neill 2004; 
van Diepen 2000). 
For instance, a study of the energy 
consumption from 1970-1990 in developed 
countries shows that, using either number 
of households or population size as the 
demographic unit of analysis leads to 
substantially different conclusions about 
the demographic impact on energy use. 
In this study, the total increase of energy 
consumption, 97.4 MTOE,3 is decomposed 
into demographic effects and economic-
technological effects. If one uses population 
size as the demographic variable in the 
analysis, demographic factors account 
for only one-third of the total increase 
in energy consumption. However, if one 
uses the number of households as the 
demographic variable, demographic factors 
contribute to 76% of the total increase 
(Mackellar et al. 1995). This large difference 
is mainly due to the impacts of household 
compositional changes, in which the 
proportion of smaller households to the 
total number of households has expanded, 
and subsequently increases in the number 
of households has been much faster than 
increases in population size. Owing to the 
loss of economies of scale, the per capita 
energy consumption of smaller households 
is significantly higher than that of larger 
households. As a result, total energy 
consumption has increased significantly 
even though the population growth rate  
has slowed. 
agINg aND URbaNIzaTION 
ImPaCTs ON emIssIONs IN 
ChINa
Considering the effects of population aging 
and urbanization, projections of future 
carbon emissions in China show that the 
country’s annual carbon emissions will 
increase from 1.2 GtC4 in 2000 to 3.8 GtC by 
the end of the century (Figure 3) (Dalton et 
al. 2007). This estimate of carbon emissions 
is 45% higher in 2100 than projections that 
do not incorporate aging and urbanization. 
While urbanization drives emissions up 
in China due to higher per capita fossil 
fuel consumption in urban areas, aging 
will contribute to higher emissions up to 
year 2030 and then to lower emissions 
thereafter, as the proportion of the labor 
force population declines. 
A study of the energy 
consumption from 
1970-1990 in developed 
countries shows that, 
using either number of 
households or population 
size as the demographic 
unit of analysis leads to 
substantially different 
conclusions about the 
demographic impact on 
energy use. 
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agINg aND TeChNOlOgICal 
ChaNge ImPaCTs ON 
emIssIONs IN The U.s.
Similar analysis for the U.S., shown in 
Figure 4, suggests that under certain 
circumstances, the impact of population 
compositional changes (mainly aging) 
on carbon emissions is even larger than 
that of technological changes (technology 
related to energy intensity and carbon 
intensity) (Dalton et al. 2007). Sensitivity 
analyses were used to understand 
the relative importance of aging and 
technological changes for future carbon 
emissions. 
These analyses test the different emission 
paths under four cases. In the first case, 
no technological change or aging is 
considered—in other words, population size 
is used as the only demographic variable 
in the model. This analysis showed that 
total emissions will increase from 1.5 GtC 
in 2000 to 3.6 GtC in 2100. In the second 
case, both technological change and aging 
are considered in the model, and this 
analysis results in the lowest increase in 
annual carbon emissions—up to about 2 GtC 
by the end of century. The model is then 
used to test the relative importance of aging 
and technological changes by considering 
other two cases: one that considers only 
aging, and another that considers only 
technological change. 
These analyses reveal that while population 
aging generally drives emissions down, 
technological changes contribute to slightly 
higher emissions in the first half of the 
century, due to the fact that technological 
advancement will increase energy efficiency 
and reduce costs, encouraging more 
energy consumption. This positive 
relationship between technological change 
and carbon emissions will remain unchanged 
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The impact of population 
compositional change 
(aging in this case) on the 
climate system could be 
more significant than that of 
technological changes up 
to year 2085—the emissions 
level will be higher in the 
case of considering only 
technological change than 
in the case of considering 
only aging before 2085
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up to 2050 until further improvement in 
technology is achieved, which induces 
substantial reduction in the intensities of 
energy consumption and carbon emissions 
and eventually drives total emissions down 
to a level lower than in the first case that 
considers only aging. Further, under certain 
circumstances, the impact of population 
compositional change (aging in this case) on 
the climate system could be more significant 
than that of technological changes up to year 
2085—the emissions level will be higher in 
the case of considering only technological 
change than in the case of considering only 
aging before 2085.
This section has shown that it is important 
to understand the impacts of both an 
increase of population size as well as 
changes in demographic composition in 
addressing climate change. 
 Analysis has shown that different   
 consumption and emission behaviors 
exist among population groups by 
various characteristics and that the 
proportion of population groups with 
different consumption and emission 
behaviors will change significantly in 
the future. The next section addresses 
the relationship between demographic 
trends and adaptation to climate change. 
aNTICIPaTeD POPUlaTION 
TReNDs aND aDaPTaTION 
TO The ImPaCTs Of ClImaTe 
vaRIaTION aND ChaNge.
Potential effects of climate change on 
population
While mitigation may be the best means 
of avoiding risks related to climate change, 
the world cannot rely solely on mitigation 
to ease the effects of climate change 
on people. All existing projections under 
Figure 4.  Impacts of aging and technology on carbon  


























the IPCC framework show that global 
greenhouse gas emissions in all scenarios 
will continue to increase at least up to 
the year 2020. Due to the persistence of 
carbon in the atmosphere, global warming is 
inevitable under any scenario in the coming 
decades (IPCC 2007). Therefore, climate 
change is leading to large-scale irreversible 
effects, whose likelihood, magnitude and 
timing is observed to be both increasing 
and accelerating. Many consequences 
of global warming once thought to be 
controversial are now being observed (IPCC 
2007). Seemingly small values of warming 
(1 to 2.5 degree Celsius) are expected to 
produce net benefits in the short-term 
in some regions and for some activities 
(e.g. agricultural and transportation) and 
net costs for others. However, greater 
warming in the long run would produce net 
costs in all regions and affect increasing 
numbers of people. Moreover, the poorest 
countries and population groups will bear 
the brunt of changes related to climate 
change; attention to adaptation strategies 
will be critical for these countries. Attention 
to demographic factors, including fertility 
rates, population growth rates, urbanization 
and encroachment of populations into 
ecologically marginal areas, will strengthen 
understanding of vulnerability and 
approaches to adaptation. 
UNeveNly DIsTRIbUTeD 
effeCTs Of ClImaTe ChaNge 
While the whole world is being 
increasingly affected by global warming, 
the impact of climate change on 
the human population is not evenly 
distributed across regions. Spatial analysis 
of the current hotspots of climate-related 
hazards (cyclones, droughts, floods, and 
landslides) shows that those hazards largely 
concentrate in certain areas, leaving the 
rest of the world relatively risk-free (Figure 
5).5 The poor are at significantly higher risk 
of most climate-related hazards. Spatial 
analysis of hazard distribution indicates that 
low income populations have been affected 
by more types of climate-related hazards 
While mitigation may be 
the best means of avoiding 
risks related to climate 
change, the world cannot 
rely solely on mitigation to 
ease the effects of climate 
change on people. 
Figure 5. global distribution of climate-related hazard hotspots
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than those of high or middle-high income 
populations (Figure 6). While poor people 
are more likely affected by droughts, floods 
and landslides, the prevailing hazards for the 
rich are cyclones. Moreover, future climate 
change will continuously and increasingly hit 
poor and vulnerable populations the hardest.  
 It is projected that those living in  
sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia 
will suffer the most, while some people 
living in high latitudes will not have any 
impacts or even benefit from climate 
change for at least some time  
(IPCC 2007). 
This analysis also shows that areas of 
low income or low-middle income have 
significantly higher population densities 
than those in high or middle-high income 
areas (Figure 6). In 2005, the average 
population density in developing countries 
was 66 people/km2, which is more than 
double the figure in developed regions 
(27 people/km2). Under high population 
pressure, a large share of the population 
in the developing world is already living in 
marginalized areas, which are susceptible 
to climate variation and extreme weather 
events. For instance, around one-sixth of 
the world’s population is living in arid 
Moreover, the poorest 
countries and population 
groups will bear the brunt 
of changes related to 
climate change; attention to 
adaptation strategies will be 
critical for these countries.
Figure 6.  Climate-related hazards and population density 
by income level
Note: (1) The unit of analysis is a grid cell with the world divided into a 2.8 x 2.8 grid. (2) Income level is derived based on per 
capita GDP of each grid and grouped into income quartile. A low income area could be in a relatively rich country, while a high 
income area could be in a relatively poor country. (3) ‘Number of hazards’ is based on the proportion of areas of each income 
group suffering from each type of hazard. The sum of proportions of all four types of hazards indicates the average number 
of hazards suffered by people by income level. (4) Each grid is assigned a group value for population density, according to its 
population density, from 1 (the lowest density) to 10 (the highest density). ‘Population density index’ is the average population 
density group value of all the grids in each income group.  
Source: Center for Hazards and Risk Research (CHRR), Center for International Earth Science Information (CIESIN), and Interna-
































































and semi-arid regions; more than 250 
million people are directly affected by 
desertification, while another one billion 
are at risk (World Bank 1999). The world’s 
major arid regions are in the developing 
world, where the population growth rate is 
high, and socio-development levels are low 
(UNDP 1999). 
Poor and vulnerable populations are those 
living in places exposed to climate risks, 
heavily dependent on climate for survival, 
and who have fewer resources to cope 
with the adverse impacts of climate 
change. Coupled with high fertility rates 
and rapid population growth rates that 
outpace the ability of countries to provide 
services including schooling, employment 
opportunities, and infrastructure, poor 
people are becoming even more vulnerable 
to changes in climate. Future global 
warming will exacerbate their vulnerability. 
For example, 70 percent of the African 
population relies on rain-fed agriculture 
for their livelihoods, and a slight shift in 
rainfall patterns or temperature can be 
disastrous (Pinstrup-Aderesen 2002). A 1° 
C temperature rise may not seem much to 
Europeans, who enjoy relatively abundant 
water resources, and can easily adapt to 
the changes through import or preventive 
agricultural or bioengineering projects. 
However, few African countries have the 
resources to prepare for climate change, and 
the effect of a 1° C temperature rise can 
mean significantly lower food production 
and increasing poverty, and increased 
felling of trees to make charcoal, leading 
to soil loss and further desertification. 
Generational subdividing of increasingly 
small agricultural plots among large numbers 
of children drives already vulnerable 
populations into increasingly marginalized 
land. Agricultural production loss in rural 
areas of the least developed countries, 
combined with rapid population growth, 
results in an increasing flow of rural 
migrants into urban areas of coastal 
areas, which are largely flood-prone low 
elevation zones. This movement from rural 
areas will put a growing number of urban 
populations at risk (McGranahan 2007). The 
populations of many countries in Africa 
will double within the next 40 years, 
and some countries with chronic food 
insecurity, including Ethiopia, will double 
in closer to 25 years (Worku 2007; UNPD 
2007). Countries that cannot cope with 
current population sizes will be severely 
strained to cope in such a short time span 
with populations double their current size. 
Even relatively small differences in projected 
population growth trends—such as the 
upward adjustment of 300 million in the 
most recent medium population projections 
for 2050 (discussed in more detail 
below)—are significant when it becomes 
clear that the majority of the projected 
population growth is likely to occur in areas 
of the world that are already beginning to 
experience climate change impacts, and 
that the growth is likely to be concentrated 
among population groups—poor, urban, and 
coastal—that are already highly vulnerable to 
climate change impacts.
majOR aDveRse effeCTs Of 
glObal waRmINg ON PeOPle
The five major adverse effects of global 
warming on population include heat waves, 
water stress, sea-level rise and extreme 
weather, agricultural production loss and 
spreading vectors of various diseases. 
1 heat waves: The most direct effect 
of climate change on humans is likely to 
be the impacts of higher temperatures. 
Researchers report that, with 90% 
confidence, past human influence on 
Coupled with high fertility 
rates and rapid population 
growth rates that outpace 
the ability of countries to 
provide services including 
schooling, employment 
opportunities, and 
infrastructure, poor people 
are becoming even more 
vulnerable to changes 
in climate. Future global 
warming will exacerbate 
their vulnerability. 
17  
climate was responsible for at least half 
the risk of heat waves (Stott, Stone 
and Allen 2004). Rising temperatures 
could lead to increases in cardiovascular 
disease. Hotter temperatures increase 
the concentration of ozone at ground 
level which damages lung tissues and 
adversely affects people with asthma 
and other lung diseases (McMichael 
et al. 2003). Additionally, heat waves 
may contribute to increased mortality. 
For example, the European heat wave 
of 2003 caused 22,080–44,000 excess 
deaths (Kosatsky 2005; Schar and 
Jendritzky 2004). Rising temperatures 
in winter may reduce death from cold 
in Europe (Keatinge et al. 2000; Kovats 
2008; Palutikof, Subak and Agnew 1997). 
At the same time, twice as many people 
die from heat as from cold each year in 
the United States (US-EPA http://www.
epa.gov/climatechange/effects/health.
html).
2 water stress: Changes in 
temperature have substantial impacts 
on precipitation patterns. In the past 
century, although annual precipitation has 
increased in large areas of the Northern 
Hemisphere, it has noticeably declined in 
subtropical southern Asia, and particularly 
sub-Saharan Africa.  
 Five billion people—more than  
 half of the world’s population—
are expected to live in water-stressed 
countries by 2050 even without 
factoring in climate change (World 
Resource Institute 2000; Military 
Advisory Board 2007). Anticipated 
changes in climate will exacerbate the 
problem of water shortages in those 
areas. Moreover, the retreat of glaciers 
due to global warming has both direct 
impacts including landslides, flash 
floods and glacial lake overflow, and also 
indirect effects such as increases in the 
annual variation of water flows in rivers. 
With more than one-sixth of the global 
population relying on glaciers and 
melting of seasonal snow packs for 
their water supply, the consequences 
of these hydrological changes for future 
water availability are likely to be severe 
(Barnett, Adam and Lettenmaier 2005).  
 By the end of the century, an   
 estimated 40 percent of the 
world’s population could be affected 
by loss of snow and glaciers in the 
mountains of Asia (UNEP 2007). Of 
particular importance are the Hindu 
Kush and Himalayan glacial melts which 
comprise the principal dry-season water 
source of many of the major rivers of 
Central, South, East and Southeast Asia. 
According to the UN climate report, the 
Himalayan glaciers could disappear in 
50 years due to global warming. During 
these decades, approximately 2.4 billion 
people living in the drainage basin of the 
Himalayan rivers in India, China, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Nepal and Myanmar could 
experience floods followed by droughts 
(UNEP 2007).
3  sea-level rise and extreme 
weather: Melting of glaciers and ice 
sheets and thermal expansion due to 
global warming has caused sea-level 
rise. Since 1900, the sea-level has risen 
at an average 1.7 mm/year; since 1993, 
the annual rising rate has increased to 
about 3 mm. Future global warming 
means sea-level rise projections in the 
IPCC’s SRES ranges from 22 centimeters 
to 38 centimeters between 1990 and 
the 2080s, at about 4 mm/year (Bindoff 
et al. 2007). Far faster sea-level rise 
(more than a meter per century) could 
result from accelerated melting of the 
Greenland ice sheet and the collapse 
of the West Antarctic ice sheet, which 
is not well accounted for in the IPCC 
analyses and projections (Hansen et 
al. 2007). Partial loss of ice sheets on 
Generational subdividing 
of increasingly small 
agricultural plots among 
large numbers of children 
drives already vulnerable 
populations into increasingly 
marginalized land. 
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polar land could imply meters of sea-
level rise, causing major changes in 
coastlines and inundation of low-lying 
areas, with the greatest effects in river 
deltas and low-lying lands. Such changes 
are projected to occur over millennia, 
but more rapid sea-level rise on century 
time scales cannot be excluded (Nicholls 
et al. 2007). Sea-level rise is also 
projected to increase salt-water intrusion 
into groundwater and cause other 
environmental damage in low elevation 
coastal zones (LECZ) (Vellinga 1989). 
 
Moreover, global warming is also 
responsible for increasing natural 
disasters caused by extreme weather 
such as tropical storms and Atlantic 
hurricanes. Although it is not conclusive 
yet as to whether global warming 
can be blamed for the increase in the 
frequencies of these extreme weather 
events, it is much more evident that 
high CO2 concentration and warmer 
sea surface temperatures contribute 
to more intensive cyclones (Emanuel 
2005; Emanuel 2008; Hoyos et al. 2006; 
Knutson 2008; Knutson 2004; Kovats 
2008; Pearce 2005). Future warming will 
lead to an upward trend in destructive 
tropical cyclones and tidal waves, 
particularly in the low elevation  
coastal zone. 
 
The impact of extreme weather and 
sea-level rise is particularly significant 
due to the concentration of population 
and economic activities on and near 
coastlines. Human settlement has 
long been drawn to coastal areas, 
which provide many resources and 
trading opportunities but also expose 
residents to various hazards (Pielke et 
al. 2008). Overall, the low elevation 
coastal zone covers two percent of 
the world’s land area, but contains 10 
percent of global population. Moreover, 
least developed countries have a higher 
share of population (14%), particularly 
urban population (21%), living in coastal 
zones, compared to developed countries 
which have only 10 percent of their 
total population and 11 percent of their 
urban population living in coastal areas 
(McGranahan, Balk and Anderson 2007). 
Taking into account an increasing coastal 
population, sea-level rise and extreme 
weather will affect an estimated 20 
percent of the population in developing 
countries and lead to a substantial 
increase in economic losses in the 21st 
century (McGranahan, Balk and Anderson 
2007). Nicholls (2004) has estimated that 
in the absence of any other changes, a 
sea-level rise of 38 cm would increase by 
five-fold the number of people flooded by 
storm surges. 
4  agricultural production loss: 
Temperature increases and increases in 
atmospheric CO2 levels may enhance 
agricultural productivity in mid- and high 
latitudes, but will surely hurt agriculture 
in the tropics and subtropics, where 
crops already exist at the top of their 
temperature range (IPCC 2007). While 
global agricultural production appears 
stable, regional differences in crop 
production are likely to grow over time 
and lead to a significant polarization 
effect, with continuous crop production 
increase in developed countries but 
decrease in the developing world. Under 
all of the IPCC SRES scenarios, if climate 
change effects dominate, world crop 
yields are likely to be more negatively 
affected (9% to 22% reduction by 
2080 relative to current crop production 
level) (Parry et al. 2004). Under the UN 
medium population projection, with 
fertility rates in the least 
developed countries remain 
much higher than in Europe 
and, more recently, East Asia. 
The annual reduction in the 
total fertility rate (TFR) in 
the regions with the highest 
population growth rate.
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substantial agricultural production loss 
and an increase in the prices of crops due 
to climate changes, an additional 90 to 
more than 125 million people by 2080 in 
the poor nations will be at risk of hunger 
(Parry, Rosenzweig and Livermore 2005).  
5  spreading vector-borne 
diseases: Global warming may 
extend the zones that are favorable for 
vectors conveying infectious disease 
such as malaria and dengue fever 
(Reiter et al. 2004; Rogers and Randolph 
2000; Simon et al. 2002). In the richer 
countries the consequences may be felt 
more in economic than health terms, 
due to disease control measures such 
as vaccination, draining swamps and 
pesticide use. However, spreading 
vectors may lead to higher incidence of 
these diseases in less developed nations. 
The World Health Organization, using 
standardized methods to quantify global 
and regional health consequences of 
climate change, indicates that in 2000, 
globally 154,000 deaths (or 0.3% of total 
deaths) and 5.5 million disability-adjusted 
life years (DALYs) (or 0.5% of all DALYs) 
lost are attributed to climate changes 
(McMichael et al. 2003; McMichael et 
al. 2004). Compared to the numbers in 
2000, future health impacts attributed to 
climate change (DALYs and deaths due to 
malnutrition, diarrhea, malaria, and floods) 
are projected to approximately double 
by 2020. The number of deaths due to 
climate change by 2030 will increase 3 
percent for diarrhea diseases, 5 percent 
for malaria diseases, and 10 percent for 
malnutrition (Campbell-Lendrum et  
al. 2005). 
aNTICIPaTeD POPUlaTION 
gROwTh PUTs aN 
INCReasINg NUmbeR Of 
PeOPle aT RIsk IN mUCh Of 
The DevelOPINg wORlD
Traditionally, demographers assume that 
all countries of the world, after completing 
the process of demographic transition, will 
converge demographically. This vision is 
typically reflected in the long-held United 
Nations population projections (UNPD 
2007), in which all countries of the world are 
assumed to converge to replacement level 
fertility of 2.1 children per woman and even 
to the same low level of mortality.  
 As a result, demographic differentials 
 around the world are supposed 
to disappear. In reality, however, 
demographic trends in the past decades 
have shown little convergence, and 
anticipated population growth will not 
help to reduce the degree of uneven 
population distribution across developed 
and less developed regions in coming 
decades. 
During the past five decades, all regions 
of the world have experienced fertility 
decline, although as the panel on the right 
in Figure 7 shows, fertility rates in the 
least developed countries remain much 
higher than in Europe and, more recently, 
East Asia. The annual reduction in the total 
fertility rate (TFR) in the regions with the 
highest population growth rate (i.e. the least 
developed regions, particularly sub-Saharan 
Africa) is considerably slower than the 
regions with the lowest fertility in Europe 
(particularly Eastern and Southern Europe), 
and East Asia (left panel in Figure 7). 
Demographic trends show that we are living 
in an increasingly demographically divergent 
world (Dorius 2008; Kent 2005, Bloom, 
Canning and Sevilla 2008), in which the gaps 
between high and low fertility regions are 
enlarged. While some European countries 
have already experienced population decline, 
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population in the less developed regions 
continues to grow. 
Continuously high fertility levels in the 
least developed countries will cause 
further rapid population growth in those 
regions, where people do not have 
adequate resources and are therefore at 
high risk of the adverse effect of climate 
changes. 
ImPlICaTIONs Of POlICy  
ResPONses fOR POPUlaTION 
PROjeCTIONs 
Given that population and a range of 
demographic factors are important to both 
mitigation and adaptation to climate change, 
how important are population policies? 
An analysis of the practices of population 
projections conducted by the UN Population 
Division over the last half century is 
instructive in showing the effects of policy 
attention to demographic trends. 
In the 1960s, world attention to rapid 
population growth resulted in international 
efforts to promote smaller family size 
through the use of voluntary family planning 
and other development efforts. More 
recently, attention once paid to demographic 
trends and resources allocated for family 
planning have both waned, and the effects 
of these fluctuations in policy attention are 
borne out in the UN population projections.     
Since 1950, the UN Population Division has 
undertaken 20 runs of population projection/
estimates, which assess the changes in 
population size, age and sex composition 
for both the world and individual countries/
regions. During the 1970s and 1980s, all 
UN population projection revisions were 
Figure 7. Uneven fertility changes across regions 
Note: The chart on the left is a scatter plot of the percentage of TFR reduction of each period and the trend lines for each region. 





























































































































































































systematically and considerably over-
predicting global population growth. The 
over-projection was due to the fact that 
rapid fertility decline in the developing world, 
largely driven by effective family planning 
and reproductive health programs since the 
1960s,6 was unexpected and unaccounted 
for by the population forecasters. With an 
increased understanding of the extent of 
fertility decline in the past decades, the UN 
Population Division adjusted downward its 
medium population projection for 2000 from 
6.26 billion in the 1990 Revision to 6.06 
billion in the 1998 Revision; similarly, the 
medium population projection for 2050 was 
also adjusted downward from 9.8 billion in 
the 1994 Revision to 8.9 billion in the 1998 
Revision (Figure 8). 
These adjustments were based primarily 
on the assumption that the expansion of 
contraception and family planning services 
in developing nations from the 1960s to 
the 1980s would continue to drive fertility 
levels down further (Lutz et al. 2007). 
These assumptions did not hold true. 
The most recent worldwide population 
censuses and surveys reveal that the actual 
population sizes of the world in 2000 and 
2005 were significantly higher than what 
was predicted in the UN medium population 
projection in the late 1990s and the early 
part of this century (the small chart in Figure 
8), largely due to a decline in attention 
to family planning and reproductive 
health programs and services in the 
recent decade7 (Cleland and Bernstein 
2006; Speidel and Grossman 2007). 
Acknowledging the stagnant fertility in 
regions of high population growth, including 
Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and 
the Caribbean (Bongaarts 2008), the UN 
gradually adjusted upward the medium 
population for 2050 in the most recent 
projections, from 8.9 billion in the 1998 
Revision to 9.2 billion in the 2006 Revision.   
Figure 8. UN Medium Population Projections since 1990 
Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects (various issues), Population Division, 
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One may argue that the differences be-
tween a population size of 8.9 billion and 
9.2 billion over a period of 50 years is not 
significant at a global level. Indeed, it would 
not make much difference if the extra 
population growth would be evenly 
allocated across regions. However, as 
above-mentioned, the global picture of 
relatively stable population growth hides 
very important regional shifts: the rapid 
population growth in sub-Saharan Africa was 
largely offset by the much lower popula-
tion growth rate than previously anticipated 
in Eastern Europe and China. Under the 
UN medium population projection, without 
immigrants from developing countries, the 
population of the more developed regions is 
expected to decline by 2.3 million annually 
after 2010. In contrast, the population of the 
50 least developed countries will likely more 
than double (passing from 0.8 billion in 2007 
to 1.7 billion in 2050), while growth in the 
rest of the developing world is also project-
ed to be robust (rising from 4.6 billion to 6.2 
billion in the same period) (UNPD 2007). 
Changes in policy attention to population 
stabilization, along with weakened 
health care and family planning services 
in the past decades, have resulted in 
substantial changes in our vision of the 
demographic future. Family planning and 
reproductive health, delivered according 
to the international consensus forged at 
the International Conference on Population 
and Development (ICPD) in 1994 in Cairo 
(UNFPA 2008), have significant implications 
for future population dynamics, particularly 
for the global poor who already have higher 
population density, and are susceptible 
to or unable to cope with the adverse 
impacts of climate change. Family planning 
and reproductive health could help least 
developed and developing countries to 
speed up their demographic transition, 
enabling them to achieve demographic 
windows of opportunity which may 
contribute to rapid economic growth—a 
phenomenon observed in East Asia and 
other parts of the world (Ross 2004). More 
than 120 million women say they would 
prefer to avoid a pregnancy, but are not 
using any form of contraception (Singh et 
al. 2003). If women who rely on traditional 
methods of family planning are included in 
the estimate of unmet need, the figure rises 
to 201 million women. In sub-Saharan Africa, 
one in four married women have an unmet 
need for contraception (Sedge et al. 2007). 
In addition to family planning and 
reproductive health services, the ICPD 
Programme of Action also called for 
implementing a range of programming, 
including promoting gender equity, to 
facilitate the demographic transition as 
soon as possible in countries where there 
is an imbalance between demographic 
growth rates and social, economic and 
environmental goals, while respecting 
human rights. Slowing population growth 
could help slow the growth of greenhouse 
gas emissions, and could help countries 
buy time to promote education, advance 
technological progress, achieve rapid 
economic growth, and increase their 
resilience and capacity to adapt to climate 
change and to meet the Millennium 
Development Goals (USAID Health Policy 
Initiatives, 2006). 
Family planning and 
reproductive health could 
help least developed and 
developing countries to 
speed up their demographic 
transition, enabling them 
to achieve demographic 
windows of opportunity 




Strong evidence exists showing that demographic change is closely associated with greenhouse gas 
emissions, and that population dynamics will play a key role in attempts to mitigate and adapt to the effects of 
changes in the climate system in the future. It is clear that analyzing the compositional change of populations, 
specifically the age composition, the distribution of people in urban and rural areas, and household size and 
composition, is very important for understanding future needs and potential for mitigating carbon emissions 
and climate change. The analysis presented in this paper shows that by including only population size as 
the demographic variable in climate models, the contribution of “population” to climate change has been 
underestimated. 
 
Similarly, understanding demographic trends, including fertility, population growth, urbanization, migration from 
environmentally depleted areas, and growing population density in marginal and vulnerable areas, is also crucial 
for the world to adapt to and cope with the adverse impacts of current and projected climate change. 
 
Sir Nicholas Stern (2006) states that climate change threatens to cause the greatest and widest ranging market 
failure ever seen. He warns that one percent of global GDP must be invested in order to mitigate climate 
change, and that failure to do so could risk a recession worth up to 20 percent of global GDP. Moreover, the 
adverse effects of climate change cannot be bound within any administrative boundaries. Climate change 
poses a grave challenge for the whole world and has wide ranging implications for human well-being as well 
as for security (Campell 2007; Military Advisory Board 2007), including the risk of armed conflict over resources 
and large-scale migrations of population within nations and across national borders. The IPCC estimates that 
150 million environmental refugees will exist in 2050, due mainly to the effects of coastal flooding, shoreline 
erosion and agricultural disruption (McCarthy et al. 2001). 
 
A range of development policies are urgently needed to address this situation, including renewed commitment 
to meeting the globally agreed Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Investments in family planning and 
reproductive health, girls education, economic opportunities and empowering of women, and in youth could 
help least developed and developing countries to speed up their demographic transition, enabling them 
to achieve demographic windows of opportunity which may contribute to economic growth and a greater 
capacity to cope with climate change impacts. Population dynamics should not continue to be ignored in 
climate change adaptation strategies, and effective measures must meet the needs of the world’s most 
vulnerable citizens, including the needs of women. 
 
Combating climate change calls for the spirit of environmental stewardship and international cooperation on a 
range of emissions reduction and adaptation approaches. These approaches will benefit from greater attention 
to population dynamics, including growth, household structure, urbanization and aging. Population policies 
and programs that promote universal access to voluntary contraception, when linked with broader efforts to 
address a range of demographic factors and meet development and poverty reduction objectives, such as the 
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